An orchestrator delegates to a sub-agent with token exchange

The chain, step by step

1. 1

   Step 1: Alex → to Orchestrator agent

   Write me a report from this quarter's documents

   The orchestrator already holds an access token for the documents API that Alex obtained through the usual authorization code flow.

   1.1. Delegation vs. Impersonation SemanticsOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

   Alex's access token held by the orchestratortyp at+jwt · alg ES256 · kid docs-2026

   iss

   https://auth.docs.example

   sub

   alex

   aud

   https://api.docs.example

   client_id

   orchestrator

   scope

   docs:read docs:write

   exp

   1790000000

   iat

   1789996400

   jti

   a1

   Unchanged since the previous token in this chain.

2. 2

   Step 2: Orchestrator agent → to auth.docs.example

   POST /token: grant_type=token-exchange, subject_token=<Alex's token>, actor_token=<orchestrator credential>, audience=https://api.docs.example, scope=docs:read

   Delegation, not impersonation: the orchestrator identifies itself with an actor token and asks for less than it holds.

   2.1. RequestOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

3. 3

   Step 3: auth.docs.example → to Orchestrator agent

   Delegated token: sub=alex, act.sub=orchestrator, scope=docs:read

   4.1. act (Actor) ClaimOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

   Delegated token for the orchestratortyp at+jwt · alg ES256 · kid docs-2026

   iss

   https://auth.docs.example

   sub

   alex

   aud

   https://api.docs.example

   client_id

   orchestrator

   scopechanged

   docs:read

   actadded

   {
     "sub": "orchestrator"
   }

   may_actadded

   {
     "sub": "research-subagent"
   }

   expchanged

   1789998200

   iatchanged

   1789996500

   jtichanged

   a2

   6 claims differ from the previous token in this chain. may_act says which party the subject allows to act on this token next; the authorization server checks it on the following exchange.

4. 4

   Step 4: Orchestrator agent → to Research sub-agent

   Task: summarise the quarter's documents; here is the delegated token to exchange

   The sub-agent does not present this token to the API. It is the subject token for the sub-agent's own exchange.

   1.1. Delegation vs. Impersonation SemanticsOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

   Delegated token, handed to the sub-agenttyp at+jwt · alg ES256 · kid docs-2026

   iss

   https://auth.docs.example

   sub

   alex

   aud

   https://api.docs.example

   client_id

   orchestrator

   scope

   docs:read

   act

   {
     "sub": "orchestrator"
   }

   may_act

   {
     "sub": "research-subagent"
   }

   exp

   1789998200

   iat

   1789996500

   jti

   a2

   Unchanged since the previous token in this chain.

5. 5

   Step 5: Research sub-agent → to auth.docs.examplereplaces "second-exchange"

   POST /token: grant_type=token-exchange, subject_token=<delegated token>, actor_token=<credential of an agent the token never authorised>

   2.1. RequestOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

6. 6

   Step 6: auth.docs.example → to itselfremoved by the toggle

   Check may_act on the subject token names the actor; keep scope within the subject token's

   The chain can only grow by parties the previous token authorised, and never wider.

   4.4. may_act (Authorized Actor) ClaimOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

7. 7

   Step 7: auth.docs.example → to Research sub-agentreplaces "second-delegated"

   Delegated token with an actor the subject never allowed

   4.1. act (Actor) ClaimOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

   Delegated token for an unauthorised actortyp at+jwt · alg ES256 · kid docs-2026

   iss

   https://auth.docs.example

   sub

   alex

   aud

   https://api.docs.example

   client_idchanged

   stranger-agent

   scope

   docs:read

   actchanged

   {
     "sub": "stranger-agent",
     "act": {
       "sub": "orchestrator"
     }
   }

   expchanged

   1789997900

   iatchanged

   1789996600

   jtichanged

   a4

   may_actremoved

   no longer in the token

   6 claims differ from the previous token in this chain.

8. 8

   Step 8: Research sub-agent → to Documents API

   GET /documents?quarter=2026-Q3 with Authorization: Bearer <delegated token>

   4. Validating JWT Access TokensJSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens rfc

   Delegated token as presentedtyp at+jwt · alg ES256 · kid docs-2026

   iss

   https://auth.docs.example

   sub

   alex

   aud

   https://api.docs.example

   client_idchanged

   research-subagent

   scope

   docs:read

   actchanged

   {
     "sub": "research-subagent",
     "act": {
       "sub": "orchestrator"
     }
   }

   exp

   1789997900

   iat

   1789996600

   jtichanged

   a3

   3 claims differ from the previous token in this chain.

9. 9

   Step 9: Documents API → to itself

   Validate signature, iss, aud and exp; enforce docs:read; log sub and the act chain

   The audit record says the sub-agent read documents for Alex by way of the orchestrator, and the API can refuse actors it does not expect.

   4.1. act (Actor) ClaimOAuth 2.0 Token Exchange rfc

10. 10

    Step 10: Documents API → to Research sub-agent

    200 with the documents

    4. Validating JWT Access TokensJSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens rfc